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Experience of Using a Type Signature Password-5ystem for User Authentication in 
a Heavily Used Computing Environment 
Mikt Ntw~rry 
JtMi[U Stbtrry 
Department of Computer Science 
University College, University of NSW 
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a user authentication system based around the usa's type signature, a sta-
tistical measureorthe lISer's typing style. It was tested on two heavily loadedcompulerS. 
Traditionally, users have been authenticated by asking them to provide some fonn of 
password. This password has been stored securely in the computer and used to check the 
identity of the user at various times, such as when the he or she finitlogs on. However 
such authentication only really proves that the challenged user knows the password - it 
doesn't identify the user. This has often been a security problem in time-shared com-
puter installations, when unauthorised users (the proverbial hackers) have obtained the 
passwords of valid users and used these to penettate the site's security. 
This has lead to much work to identify users uniquely by more secure means, such as 
fingerprints. Such measures all try to identify a user by checking some attribute of the 
person. The idea of a type-signature is one such approach. 
In 1985, Terry Jones first proposed the idea of a type-signature [Jones1985]. The type-
signature was a statistical measure of the typing style of the user. It was calculated by 
measuring the time that elapsed between keystrokes. This type-signature, and the usual 
password, were then checked whenever the user logged on. It was intended that this 
would provide a greater level of security than just a password, as this system would reject 
an intruder whose Iyping pattern was incorrect. 
1. The System 
In December 1986 we commenced testing the concept of the type-signaturel. Over the 
next two months several mini password systems, based. around this concept, were 
developed and installed by Mike Newberry on various machines to test them under 
different conditions. 
1_1 Implementation 
The following major functions were identified for a user authentication system: 
• For users: 
- to successfully authenticate valid users; 
- to enable valid users to change their passwords; 
- to allow the type-signature to gradually change, to match the user's changing 
typing pattern (for instance, as a user became more familiar with a password their 
',.--::Th:C-.-.-u-"unded by a grant lrom A lERB. 
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typing would improve). 
• For system sraff: 
- 10 redefine a user's password and type-signature; 
- 10 receive regular perfonnance summaries; 
- to aller system parameters to make it easier or harder for users to log-on (if, for 
instance. valid users are having trouble logging-on). 
1.1 User Authentication 
The following sequence of operations were perfonned to authenticate a user. 
1. The user would supply a user-name. If this was nOI a valid name, the process would 
halt; 
2. The user would type a passwOId. The computer would encrypt and record this 
password and the associated type-signature; 
3. The offered password (now encrypted) would be compared with the user's acrual 
encrypted passwoni. If this test failed, the process would halt; 
4. The offered type-signature would be compared with the user's recorded (encrypted) 
type-signature. This involved !Csting whether the interval between keystrokes was 
in the range 
[ average - (o*sd), average + (o*sd) ] 
where average and sd were the recorded average and standard deviation between 
that pair of keystrokes, and I) was a system parameter. Even a good typist would not 
always be in this range, so this test could fail one time for every e characters in the 
password, and the user still be allowed onto the system. Thus a longer password 
made it easier for a valid user to log-on, but harder for an intruder; 
S. Finally, if all the above tests had been passed, the user's recorded, and encrypted, 
type-signalUfC was modified to reflect the way the user had typed the the password 
this time, and the user was allowed onto the system. 
This system was found 10 work acceptably in practice. More sophisticaled statistical 
approaches, such as applying a X2 test to the type-signature, were too precise and made 
logging-on too dUlicult for valid users. 
1.3 Joint Aa:ounl5 
Often computer accounts are shared (such as super-user accounts, or JOint project, 
accounts). For these accounts special provision had to be made in the type-signature 
system, as each user of the: account would have: a diffeR:nt typing style:. In this system, 
each jOint account had one password, but thc:rc: was a separate type-signarurc for each 
valid user. The owner of the account would log-on nonnally (that is, by specifying the 
account name, and correctly typing the password). However, other people sharing the 
account would log-on using a composite name of the form: 
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<account namc>:<user name> 
The password for the shared account could only be changed by the acCOWlt owner: when 
this happened. each of the composite users of the account would be allowed to log-on 
once more using the old password. When they logged-on they would be told that the 
password had been changed. and to see the account holder 10 have a new type-signature 
reCOtded for the new password. For example, if Jill shaIed her account with Jack. Jill 
would log-oo using the user name "jill". while Jack would 10g-oo using "jill:jack". In 
this case, only Jill could change me password. 
2. Results 
The mini system was run immediately after a user logged-on. AI first users were allowed 
to choose their own password, and these were kept secret. Initially these users could 
1og-oo easily. however after a weekend (an absence of several days) they reported that 
they were consistently failing. This occurred because in lhe preceeding week they had 
become familiar with their password, their typing speed had increased. and lhe type-
signature had been adjusted accordingly; but on Monday. when they tried to log-on their 
typing speed had reverted to its original level and lhe system rejected lhem. 
Consequently lhe a and E parameters were loosened. A benet solution might have been 
to consider the amount of time since lhe account was last used when aulhenticaring lhe 
user. Alternatively.the system might loosen or tighten the parameters depending on lhe 
time of day. or lhe day of the week. 
During lhis stage one user complained she could not log·on. She bad developed a mild 
case of RSI2 and her typing style had changed. The system detected this change. and 
refused to aulhenticate her. The system should behave similarly for any event that 
altered a type-signarure (such as intoxication). This behaviour was anticipated in 
[Joncs1985]. 
The system also refused to authenticate users when they typed with one hand. as 
expected. This in tum suggests that such a system could not be implemented wilhout lhe 
users' knowledge. 
For the next stage, all passwords were changed to a standard string of the fann; 
mynameis<user name> 
to test how secure the system was when passwords became known. It was not possible to 
uniquely identify users from their type-signatures. Moreover, there wasn't any clear 
correlation between lhe consistency of a person's typing and their account's security. 
Neither did the speed of the typing appear to make much difference. allhough very fast 
typists were harder to imitate. The critical factor appeared to be the rhythm of the typing. 
Most people eilher typed the password as a continuous stteam of characters (especially 
fast typists), or paused between words. In both lhese cases the rhylhm could be deduced. 
The most secure accounts had type-signatures lhat paused irregularly. Some users 
realised this, and introduced artificial rhythms to their typing, to make an intruder's task 
harder. This worked well while they remembered lhe rhylhm. 
2. Repetition Strain Injury 
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Through both stages the parameter mix a = 1.4, £ "" 4 allowed lhe genuine user to log-on 
89% of the time, while preventing intruders (as dctcnruned by the experiments perfonned 
above) for 43% of the time. The prevention figure would be larger in a real situation 
where us~ could choose their own passwords. It should be nOled that users in this 
experiment were experienced with computer, and so they had some typing skills -
inexperienced users may have trouble logging onto this system. 
Optimum parameters would vary highly from site to site - these parameters worked 
well in our case. 
1.1 Bull'erlna 
Critical to this system was the availability o' .. .::curate statistics about the type-signature. 
This information was distorted by any buffering of keystrokes that occurred between the 
tenninal and the cpu. For instance, the type-signature would be distorted if a terminal 
buffered all keystrokes internally, 10 send them in packets to the cpu. This was a major 
problem in this experiment On one machine the system was tested on, machine 
keystrokes were buffered at up to three different places before the type-signature was 
measured. 
This effect could be eliminated by measuring the type-signature at the tennmal itself, or 
at the first buffering point (for instance, at the first I/O board). These kind of changes 
would be easier if intelligent tenninals were being used, but could require changes to the 
operating system otherwise. 
2.2 CPU load 
Another factor that distoned the measurement of the type-signature was the number of 
times the aUlhentication program was swapped from the cpu during this process. If this 
occurred frequently, the type-signature could be distoned beyond recognition. This was 
a problem on both machines the system was tested on - whenever the computer became 
heavily loaded, the ability of the system to recognise users deteriorated. 
One solution to this would be to perfonn the user authentication at a very high priority, or 
to disable interrupts while type-signature calculations were being performed. 
2.3 Efficiency 
This type of password system was noticeably slower than a conventional system, because 
of the extra file I/O and calculation required. Moreover it also required more storage 
space especially for the type-signatures. 
3.. Conclusions 
This system added significantly to the security of the users in the experiments described 
above; even when passwords were public knowledge, intruders had only a 50/50 chance 
of successful entry. Thus, in any implementation, password imegrity would still provide 
the main level of defence, with type·signatures as a back-up defence. 
3.1 Suitability 
This SYStem works best when the type-signature can be measured directly (without any 
intcnnediate buffering), and the authentication routines can be run without interruption. 
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Users would require some minimum typing skills 10 make die system work. This all 
suggests it should only be used on machines in high security areas, or for selected 
accounts (such as those with super-user privileges). 
3.l Should we tell the users? 
One issue that arose in the trials was whether the users <should know that their typing 
patterns were significant. Scme users, because they knew they had to type in a particular 
manner, consciously tried to type that way, and failed. Others, who succeeded in 
establishing a particular rhythm in their password. later forgm this rhythm and were 
unable to log-on at all. Certainly the system is more secure if users aren't aware of the 
use of type-signatures but it seems difficult to keep Ihis hidden. 
3.3 Other Applications 
This style of user authentication has applications other than in computer security. One 
suggested application has been in the area of academic examinations, by computer. In 
this application, students in remote areas studying by correspondence, could do their 
examinations locally by computer, rather than travelling long distances to be examined at 
regional centres. Such a system would only work if the examiner was sure the person 
doing the exam was the student. and not a friend who did the course last year - for this 
authentication type-signatures could be useful. 
4. Summary 
In any area where it is critical that users be identified correctly, the type-signature 
provides greater security than just a password, although it is not foolproof. However it is 
slower, and requires more storage space than conventional password systems. Moreover, 
type-signature gathering may not be practical in some circumstances because of cpu 
scheduling and buffering requirements. 
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